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The Mujahidin Middleman: Pakistan's
Role in the Afghan Crisis and the
International Rule of Non-Intervention
I. Introduction
In today's international environment, foreign interference in the
internal affairs of a state is becoming commonplace.' The foreign
incursions of the Soviet Union and the United States alone have
dominated the headlines for the last several decades.2 Interferences
of this type are most dangerous to world peace when these two su-
perpowers face off against each other while hiding behind opposing
sides of a civil war. Afghanistan is now involved in such a crisis.
Caught between this superpower struggle for power is Pakistan.
Pakistan is faced with the difficult problem of balancing delicate for-
eign relations and international responsibilities with the very real
dangers and problems caused by its neighbor, Afghanistan.
In recent history, the duty of non-intervention was recognized in
theory, but largely ignored in action.' States violating this duty ex-
cused their actions as justified,4 and the rule of non-intervention be-
gan to lose force. The rule regained strength in 1986, with the deci-
sion of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. The
United States.5 This world court opinion has given new life to the
principle of non-intervention.
This Comment first will discuss the facts surrounding Pakistan's
involvement in the Afghan crisis before and during the Soviet occu-
pation of Afghanistan. Next, it will analyze these Pakistani actions
in the context of the international rule of non-intervention. The rule,
1. In recent history, there have been numerous instances of a state intervening in the
civil wars of another state, including: Bangladesh, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, El Salva-
dor, Hungary and Vietnam. Cutler, The Right to Intervene, 64 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 97, 99 (1985)
[hereinafter Cutler]. "The unintended influence of the United States within the Western
Hemisphere - taken alone - insure that such a proscription will be continually violated."
Firmage, Summary and Interpretation, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 407 (1971).
The Court in Nicaragua v. U.S. said: ". . . examples of trespass against this principle are not
infrequent .... " Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits, Judgment of June 27, 1986), at 106; 108-109; see also Id. at
108-9; C. THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVENTION, at VIII (1985).
2. For example, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Nicaragua, and the Soviet inva-
sions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Id.
3. Id.
4. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
5. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1.
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its exceptions and justifications will, in turn, be examined. This
Comment then will discuss the possibility of Soviet withdrawal of
troops from Afghanistan, and analyze Pakistan's potential actions in
light of this development.
II. History and Background
A. Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a relatively small country,6 positioned in a turbu-
lent and strategically important geographic location.' A landlocked
country, Afghanistan borders on the Soviet Union in the north,
China in the northeast, Pakistan in the east and south, and Iran in
the west. It is a Muslim country,8 with an ethnically mixed
population.'
Afghanistan has historically been an unsettled, non-aligned
country, governed by a monarch.10 The country has been unified only
since 1747, when it was founded by King Ahmed Shah Duranni."
Duranni's descendants fought amongst themselves, but retained
power until 1978.12 One member, King Zahir Shah, ruled Afghani-
stan for forty years, from 1933 until 1973.13 The monarchy ended
when, on July 17, 1973, Sardar Mohammed Daoud, a cousin of the
6. Afghanistan's population of 14.7 million (1985 estimate) consists of II million Af-
ghans living within the country, plus at least 3.7 million refugees residing in Pakistan and
Iran. Afghanistan covers an area of 260,000 square miles, which is about the size of Texas.
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 7795, BACKGROUND NOTES SE-
RIES, AFGHANISTAN (1986) at I [hereinafter BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES]; see also BUREAU
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 173, AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT
YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION (1987) at 16 [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF
SOVIET OCCUPATION] (chart showing general population statistics on Afghanistan from 1975
to 1985).
7. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, AFGHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 3.
8. 80% of the population are Sunni (Hanafi branch) and the remainder are Shi'a. Id. at
3.
9. Pukhtun (also called Pushtun and Pathan) constitutes about 40% of the population.
Other predominant ethnic groups include: Tajik, Uzbek, Turkoman, Hazar and Aimaq. Id. at
3; see also E. GIRADET, AFGHANISTAN THE SOVIET WAR I (1985) [hereinafter GIRADET]
(map of location of Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan). Pushtu is the language of about 50% of
the population, and Afghan Persian (Dari) is spoken by a third of the population. More than
70 other languages and dialects are spoken throughout the country. BACKGROUND NOTES SE-
RIES, AFGHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 3.
10. For a more in-depth discussion of Afghanistan's early history see J.C. GRIFFITHS,
AFGHANISTAN (1981); V. GREGORIAN, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AFGHANISTAN, (1969);
HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN (I. Karpikov ed. 1985); BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, AFGHANI-
STAN, supra note 6, at 3-4.
11. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES. AFGHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 4.
12. Weisman, Neighbors of Afghanistan Seek Orderly Departure by Russians, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1988, § 5 at 3, col. I [hereinafter Weisman, Neighbors of Afghanistan]; see
also Weisman, The Great Game, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10 and 17, 1987, at 21 [hereinaf-
ter Weisman, The Great Game].
13. For information on King Zahir Shah, who may be an important figure in the new
Kabul government, see AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, supra note 6, at
9; see also Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12.
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King, seized power in a military coup.14 Daoud, who was greatly in-
fluenced by the Shah of Iran, 5 pledged reform, but none was forth-
coming.16 After four years of the lack of reforms, the two major po-
litical groups in Afghanistan, Parcham and Khalqy (the People),
1 7
withdrew their support of Daoud and formed the People's Demo-
cratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). 18 Shortly thereafter, on April
27, 1978, Daoud was overthrown and assassinated in a bloody
coup. 9 Nur Mohammed Taraki took power as leader of the PDPA,
and established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).2 0
Soon after the PDPA seized power, opposition began to grow in
the Afghan countryside." Yet despite this, Taraki was holding talks
with the Soviet Union, which resulted in a new Treaty of Friendship,
Good Neighborliness and Cooperation. 2 As Moscow increased mili-
tary assistance to the Afghan regime under the treaty, other states
began to question Afghanistan's traditional non-aligned status.2
The questioning intensified in September of 1979, when
Hafizullah Amin took power and had Taraki assassinated. 4 Moscow
began to worry about the stability of the Amin regime, and about
the growing resistance within the country.
5
The overthrow of the Taraki Government served a 'blow to
the Soviet prestige' and Moscow was faced with the dilemma of
how to keep the Amin Government in power. . . . The growing
pressure of internal resistance and the Amin Government's fail-
ure to contain it, coupled with his gestures towards the United
14. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, AFGHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 4 (Daoud abolished
the monarchy upon seizing power.).
15. T. ALl, CAN PAKISTAN SURVIVE? 167-68 (1983) [hereinafter ALl].
16. After four years of Daoud rule, illiteracy had increased, 5% of homeowners owned
45% of the land, and Afghanistan had the lowest per capita income of any Asian country. Id.
at 165.
17. Parcham was led by Babrak Karmal; Khalq was led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and
Hafizullah Amin. Id. at 165.
18. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, AFGHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 4.
19. Id.
20. A struggle for power had occurred within the PDPA that resulted in Khalq taking
command of the party (led by Taraki). Parcham and its leader Karmal were ousted. ALl,
supra note 15, at 168.
21. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, AFGHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 4; see generally NABY,
THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, in AFGHAN ALTERNATIVES 65-6 (R.H. Magnus ed.
1983) (the first stages of the resistance began as early as the early 1970s).
22. The treaty was signed in December, 1978. Id.
23. Id. at 4. Since the Soviet invasion, Moscow has increased aid to Afghanistan in an
effort to rebuild the economy and the military. Moscow has also set up trade agreements, built
transportation facilities (for use by Soviet troops) and conducted natural resource exploration
and development in Afghanistan. Id. at 8; also see AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET
OCCUPATION, supra note 6, at 16 (chart showing Soviet economic aid to Afghanistan, 1980-
1986).
24. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, AFGHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 4.
25. Moscow also feared that the U.S. would take advantage of the weak Afghan regime
and support a rebel takeover of the government. Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at
21.
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States26 with a view to wriggle Afghanistan out of the Soviet
block were some of the developments which were seriously taken
note of in Moscow. 2
7
Finally, Moscow decided to act.2 On December 24, 1979, Soviet
transport planes, carrying about 4,000 Soviet troops,19 were sent into
Kabul"0 to lend "fraternal aid" to the Afghan regime." The Soviets
claimed to be in Kabul on the invitation of Amin and the PDPA;1
2
however, on December 27, 1979, just three days after the invasion,
Amin was reported dead. 3 The Soviets then flew in Babrak Karmal
from Czechoslovakia, and installed him as the new Afghan leader.3 "
Soon after gaining control, Karmal denounced Amin as an agent of
the CIA.35 Now, with a Soviet supported government in power, Mos-
cow would next look to control the anti-regime rebels interspersed
through the country.
B. Pakistan
Bordering the troubled Afghanistan and Iran on the west, Paki-
stan also shares a border with India in the east, and with China in
the north. A larger and more populous country than Afghanistan,
3
6
26. Amin had made several friendly overtures to the U.S., offering peace and welcoming
any aid that the U.S. might provide. M.A. WAKMAN, AFGHANISTAN, NON-ALIGNMENT AND
THE SUPER POWERS 122 (1985) [hereinafter WAKMAN]. Also, Amin was considering a deal
with China, whereby he could break from the Soviet Union and be indirectly tied with the
U.S. ALl, supra note 15, at 172.
27. WAKMAN, supra note 26, at 122-23.
28. While actual plans for the invasion were begun as early as March, 1979, initial
preparations for the takeover had been ongoing for several years. GIRADET, supra note 9, at
12.
29. This number was increased to 5000 on December 27, 1979. Six months later, 85,000
Soviet troops were occupying Afghanistan. This number continued to grow until in 1985 ap-
proximately 120,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan, with about 30,000 additional troops
massed at the Soviet-Afghan border. This number had since remained relatively constant.
Whitehead, Afghanistan's Struggle for Freedom, DEP'i ST. BULL., Feb. 1986 at 1 [hereinafter
Whitehead]. When the Soviets arrived in Afghanistan they joined approximately 50,000 "de-
sertion-ridden" Afghan army troops who were "halfheartedly" supporting the regime.
GIRADET, supra note 9, at 12. As of November 1985, the Afghan regime army had shrunk to
less than one-half of its pre-invasion strength of 90,000. Statement by U.S. Ambassador
Vernon A. Walters, U.N. General Assembly (Nov. 12, 1985), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Feb. 1986, at 20.
30. GIRADET, supra note 9, at 12. This marked the first time that the Soviet Union
intervened outside Eastern Europe since World War 1I. ALI, supra note 15, at 173.
31. Valenta, Soviet Aims, Policies, and Alternatives in Afghanistan, in AFGHAN ALTER-
NATIVES 13 (R.H. Magnus ed. 1983).
32. "The U.S.S.R. claimed that the Afghanistan Government had requested U.S.S.R.
intervention under a 1978 bilateral treaty of friendship .... " D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 653 (1983) [hereinafter HARRIS]; see GIRADET, supra
note 9, at 12.
33. It is believed that Amin was assassinated by a special Soviet KGB hit team.
GIRADET, supra note 9, at 12.
34. HARRIS, supra note 32, at 653.
35. ALI, supra note 15, at 172.
36. Pakistan's area is 310,527 square miles, about the size of California. In the middle
of 1986, its population was approximately 97.7 million. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
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Pakistan is a Muslim country with an ethnic majority of Punjabis.37
Throughout most of the 1970s, Pakistan was ruled by Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan's People's Party (PPP).38 In 1977,
as a result of public unrest, Bhutto offered to hold free elections.
Due to strong opposition from the Pakistan National Alliance
(PNA), the outcome of the elections was expected to be close; 9 how-
ever, Bhutto won two-thirds of the National Assembly seats. The
PNA claimed fraud, and called for a new election.4" Bhutto initially
refused, which resulted in outbreaks of violence.41 The violence
culminated on July 15, 1977, when the Pakistan army removed
Bhutto from power, and declared martial law. Upon the imposition
of such martial law, and until new elections could be held, General
Mohammed Zia ul-Haq temporarily installed himself as leader.'
Zia did not hold these elections immediately, but instead sched-
uled them for late 1979.1 As the new election date neared, Zia,
fearing defeat, again cancelled the elections."' At this time, the PPP
formed the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), in
opposition of Zia." When valid elections were finally held in 1985,
the MRD called for a boycott."' This strategy backfired on the
MRD, however, as large numbers of voters turned out and the lack
of opposition to Zia resulted in his retaining office.47 Upon taking
office again, Zia set the next elections for 1990.48
Zia's government shares many of the characteristics of a typical
military rule: censorship, imprisonment without trial, and other
human rights violations. 9 Still, Zia's position remains strong, largely
due to recent improvements in the Pakistan economy. 50 Regardless
DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 7748, BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, PAKISTAN (1987) at 1 [herein-
after BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, PAKISTAN].
37. 65% of Pakistanis speak Punjabi, 11% speak Sindi, 9% speak Urdu (official lan-
guage) and 15% speak other languages including Pushtu (the major tongue in Afghanistan).
English is also widely spoken, especially in government and military circles. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 4.
39. See Id.
40. ALl, supra note 15, at 138-42.
41. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, PAKISTAN, supra note 36, at 4.
42. Bhutto was later executed after being convicted of conspiracy. Id. at 4.
43. Zia did not hold elections because the parties involved could not agree on electoral
rules and also because Zia feared a PPP victory. Id. at 4.
44. ALI, supra note 15, at 136-39.
45. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, PAKISTAN, supra note 36, at 4.
46. The boycott was led by Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the former ruler, and the leader
of the PPP. Ispahani, The Perils of Pakistan, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 16, 1987, at 24
[hereinafter Ispahani].
47. The voter turnout for the National Assembly ballot was about 53%, and the elec-
tions were generally free of fraud. BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, PAKISTAN, supra note 36, at
5. The boycott failure has led to the decline of MRD. Ispahani, supra note 46, at 25.
48. Ispahani, supra note 46, at 24.
49. Id. at 20; see generally ZIA'S PAKISTAN (C. Baxter ed. 1985). However, it seems
that overall, Zia's rule is better than most military rules. Ispahani, supra note 46, at 20.
50. GNP is growing at a remarkable rate of 7% per year. Ispahani, supra note 46, at 25.
Spring 1988]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of the results of the 1990 elections, it is very likely that the military
will have a strong influence over all of Pakistan's policy decisions for
years to come. 1
C. Pakistan's Response to the Soviet Invasion
1. Pakistan's Initial Reaction.-When the Soviets invaded Af-
ghanistan, Pakistan suddenly became a "front-line" state. Pakistan
was no longer separated from the Soviets by the Afghan mountains;
it now had to face a 13,000 mile border that was, for all practical
purposes, a Soviet border.12 Overnight, Pakistan became of "vital in-
terest" to the United States, which pledged its military support. 53 On
the surface, Pakistan did not seem alarmed by the Soviet invasion,
for there was very little troop movement in Pakistan.5 There was,
however, one obvious change in Pakistan: the country was suddenly
flooded with Afghan refugees.55
These refugees migrated across the Pakistan border to avoid So-
viet air raids56 and over the next few years, millions of Afghan refu-
gees made their home in Pakistan. The current number of Afghan
citizens living in Pakistan now stands at more than 2.9 million.57 The
refugees have caused many problems for Pakistan, including a
shortage of jobs and a shortage of pasture land. 58 Pakistan has also
put itself at risk with Afghanistan and the Soviet Union by providing
help to the refugees. 69
51. ". . . [T]he military will likely always be present, ruling, advising, or simply casting
its shadow across civilian deliberations." Id.
52. Id.
53. Wriggins, Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghani-
stan, PACIFIC AFFAIRS, Summer, 1984, at 284 [hereinafter Wriggins]. Pakistan was a "vital
interest" to the U.S. because President Carter felt it necessary to have a Western presence in
Southern Asia, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of
Iran (formerly a pro-Western government). Therefore, President Carter committed the U.S. to
use force if necessary to defend Pakistan. Id.
54. Id. at 285. However, beneath the surface, Pakistani officials analyzed the Soviet
move and proposed two possible reasons for the invasion. First, to keep Afghanistan within the
Soviet's scientific, socialist sphere. Second, as the beginning of a long-run Soviet plan to move
toward the Arabian Sea, which would mean, of course, the eventual invasion of Pakistan. Id.
at 287.
55. See infra note 57.
56. These air raids were part of a successful Soviet strategy to depopulate the Afghan
countryside. Ispahani, supra note 46, at 21.
57. This is the single largest group of refugees in the world. The numbers still continue
to grow, but at a much slower pace than in the years immediately after the invasion. The
refugees are sheltered in more than 320 camps. In addition, nearly one million Afghan refu-
gees are living in Iran. AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, supra note 6, at
19. The refugees now living in Pakistan account for 20-25% of Afghanistan's pre-war popula-
tion. Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2.
58. Two of the biggest problems in Pakistan, drugs and guns, are commonly referred to
as the "gifts of the Afghans". Isapahani, supra note 46, at 19. Also Afghan animals, number-
ing about three million, consumed much of the available pasture land in the Buluchistan area
of Pakistan. Id. at 21.
59. The refugee situation has in part been the cause of Afghan air raids into Pakistan
and terrorism in Pakistan by KHAD (the Afghan secret police). Ispahani, supra note 46, at
[Vol. 6:3
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Beyond aid to the Afghan refugees, Pakistan's initial response
was cautious, as it feared a direct Soviet conflict. 60 Zia's initial strat-
egy was twofold: First, mobilize support from Islamic countries and
the West against the Soviet invasion; second, strengthen Pakistan's
military defense by seeking aid from a foreign power.6
Pakistan did mobilize support in opposition to the Soviet inva-
sion by strongly condemning the Soviet action.6 The invasion was
universally protested, and was also condemned by the Islamic Con-
ference in early 1980.63 While these countries were voicing their ob-
jection to the Soviet actions and implementing part one of Zia's
strategy, Pakistan began a search for a powerful ally.
After unsuccessfully attempting to mend relations with India,64
Pakistan rejected an initial offer of help from the U.S.6 5 Meanwhile,
Pakistan began receiving aid from China and the Middle East, par-
ticularly Saudi Arabia. 66 Pakistan, however, still wanted to find one
powerful ally willing to give full support. Finally, in 1981, with Pres-
ident Reagan in office, the U.S. made a second offer, and Pakistan
accepted.6 7 Pakistan had successfully achieved both of its initial
goals," but one large question still loomed, whether or not to support
the Afghan rebels and risk a direct Soviet conflict.
2. Pakistan and the Afghan Resistance.-The Afghan resis-
21. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. In 1986, Pakistan was air-raided by Soviet/
Afghan forces over 600 times. Id. at 24; see also AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET
OCCUPATION, supra not 6, at 21 (chart showing Pakistani casualties due to Soviet/Afghan air
attacks).
60. See Wriggins, supra note 53.
61. K. SAYEED, POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 186 (1980).
62. Wriggins, supra note 53, at 299-300.
63. Id. at 288.
64. At first, India sided with the Soviets, but soon after, it joined the rest of the world in
condemning the Soviet actions. Curiously, the stumbling block became the U.S. offer of help,
which India strongly protested. Later, India became more amenable to U.S. involvement, but
Pakistani-Indian relations never reached a level beyond tolerance. Id. at 288-90.
65. Pakistan declined the first U.S. offer for several reasons. First, acceptance of the
offer would further strain relations with India, and would arouse hostility among several of the
non-aligned countries and among several factions within Pakistan itself. Second, Pakistani offi-
cials questioned the loyalty and reliability of the U.S. as an ally. Last, the U.S. simply did not
offer enough money. The U.S. offer of $400 million was not enough money for Pakistan to risk
aligning itself with the U.S. Wriggins, supra note 52, at 290-91.
66. China was not willing to give full support to Pakistan, as it feared a conflict with the
Soviets. China, however, did continue its flow of military resources into Pakistan. Id. at 292-
95. Saudi Arabia also gave monetary support and now matches U.S. aid dollar for dollar.
Rashid, The Sting, THE NATION, Feb. 28, 1987, at 241.
67. This time the amount was right. The U.S. offered $3 billion in aid and agreed to sell
an advanced aircraft package to Pakistan. Also, Indian objections were softened. Id. at 296.
The U.S. offer was possible largely because the Reagan administration cared less about Pakis-
tani nuclear violations than the Carter administration. Id.; see also Gordon, Congress Delays
New Pakistan Aid Amid Nuclear Rift, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
68. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. Pakistan did well to achieve its goals. As
a result of the Soviet invasion, Pakistan had strengthened the military regime of Zia and also
had received praise from the Gulf States and Washington for its handling of the refugees. ALl,
supra note 15, at 180-81; see Wriggins, supra note 53, at 303.
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tance s is a broad national movement that includes almost the entire
population inside Afghanistan, plus the Afghan refugees, and the ex-
iles in Pakistan, Iran and throughout the world."0 The fighting men
in the resistance are collectively referred to as the mujahidin and are
located in hundreds of fronts throughout most of Afghanistan.71
Soon after the Soviet invasion, Pakistan extended an invitation to the
leaders of the mujahidin to meet, organize and plan strategy in Pe-
shawar, Pakistan.7 2 The leaders of the resistance accepted the invita-
tion, and while there is a strong independent fighting group based in
Afghanistan,73 most resistance fighters are now affiliated with one of
the seven resistance groups headquartered in Peshawar.""
While helping the Afghan rebels in other ways, Pakistan had
expressly refused to be a middleman for military supplies sent to the
mujahidin during the years immediately following the Soviet inva-
69. Presently, the primary motivation of the Afghan resistance is "to free Muslim Af-
ghan land from an atheist enemy." Therefore, the resistance refers to its struggle against the
Soviet-backed regime as jehad (meaning holy war). Naby, supra note 22, at 65.
70. AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, supra note 6, at 7.
Relatively secularist nationalists from all walks of life - students, bureau-
crats, technocrats, teachers, and professionals - took action in one of three
ways. They fled the country to join the existing resistance groups in Peshawar or
Iran, they joined the resistance in the countryside (especially true for military
men), or collaborated with the resistance in the towns while they continued hold-
ing their jobs in the private or public sector.
Naby, supra note 22, at 67; see also GIRADET, supra note 9, at 48-87; see generally Cassese,
Resistance Movements, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-90 (1982)
(general information on resistance movements).
71. Also spelled Mujahideen. The resistance fighters are commonly called "freedom
fighters," especially in Washington. For purposes of this Comment, they will also be referred
to as "rebels" and "insurgents." The term "mujahidin" is derived from the religious term
"jehad" (holy war). An individual fighter is called a "mujahid." See supra note 69.
72. Wriggins, supra note 53, at 300-01.
73. The internal rebels, independent of the Peshawar league, may be the real problem
for the Soviets. See ALl, supra note 15, at 176; also see GIRADET, supra note 9, at 55.
74. These groups are often called the Peshawar parties or the Peshawar league. The
parties are organized along political or military lines. The parties often take on the name and
personality of their leader (which is often a source of conflict between the parties). Presently,
these parties have split into two general alliances: fundamentalists and moderates. GIRADET,
supra note 9, at 55. The parties and leaders are as follows:
- Islamic Party (Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis) led by Maulavi Mohammed Yunis
Khalis, a fundamentalist party.
- Afghanistan National Liberation Front (Jebh-e-Nejat-i-Melli Afghani-
stan) led by Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, a moderate party.
- National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (NIFA) (Mahz-e-Melli) led by
Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gallani, a moderate party.
- Islamic Party (Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin since 1974) led by Gulbuddin
Hikmatyar, a fundamentalist party.
- Islamic Society (Jamiat-i-Islami) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, a fun-
damentalist party.
- Islamic Revolutionary Movement (Harakat-e-Inquilab-i-Islami) led by
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, a moderate party.
- Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (Ittihad-i-Islami) led
by Abd AI-Rab Abd ul-Rassul Sayyaf, a fundamentalist party.
AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, supra note 6, at 8; Karp, Afghanistan:
Six Years of Soviet Occupation, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1986, at 16 [hereinafter Karp];
GIRADET, supra note 9, at 55-56.
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sion.7 5 Over time, however, Pakistani views have radically changed.
Over the past several years, Pakistan has openly admitted being a
conduit for the rebels,"e and presently controls nearly all money and
supplies sent from the United States.7 Further, the Zia regime is
actively training the rebels in refugee camps located in Pakistan,78
and is allowing U.S. intelligence to do the same on a limited scale.7 9
In response to these actions, Soviet-backed Afghan leaders ordered
air strikes of rebel supply lines located in Pakistan." The recent
Pakistani actions and views on aiding the rebels have not only led to
retaliation on the part of the Soviets, but have been questioned in the
international sphere as well under the rule of non-intervention.
III. Rule of Non-Intervention
A. Sovereignty and Non-Intervention
All states, due to their independent existence, are endowed with
certain basic rights."' The foremost of these rights are sovereignty
and equality. 2 Sovereignty is the right to perform functions of a
state, to the exclusion of, and without interference from, any other
state.83 The principle of equality of states directly follows from this.
Put simply, each sovereign state must be treated, and must treat
other states, as an equal in the international community, at least in-
sofar as basic rights and duties are concerned.8 These rights of sov-
ereignty and equality form the basis for international law in the
modern world. These customary international law rights were codi-
fied in Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter. 5
Certain complementary duties arise from these basic rights.86
75. Wriggins, supra note 53, at 300.
76. Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 23.
77. Zia will not let U.S. government personnel operate in mujahidin camps, everything
must be directed by Pakistan. A large portion of the arms purchased for the rebels with U.S.
money is ordered by a committee of Pakistani generals. U.S.-backed Rebels in Afghanistan,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1987, at 32-33; Girardet, The Alchemy of Turning Guns into Luxury
Villas, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 30, 1987, at 36.
78. ALl, supra note 15, at 176.
79. Rashid, supra note 65, at 241.
80. Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 23; see also supra note 59.
81. 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (1966) [hereinafter
BROWNLIE].
82. Id.
83. Island of Palmas Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), noted in
A. LAWSON, SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 375 (1965); J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 152 (9th ed. 1984) [hereinafter STARKE]. Sovereignty can also be defined
as "the residuum of power which is possesses within the confines laid down by international
law." STARKE, at 96; see generally Wildhaber, Sovereignty and International Law 425-52
(1983).
84. See generally Pechota, Equality: Political Justice In an Unequal World, in THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 453-84 (1983).
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1, reads: "The Organization is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its Members." (emphasis added).
86. BROWNLIE, supra note 81, at 250. Readily identifiable duties include the duty of
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These duties not only further a state's basic rights, but also, define
and limit its allowed and required actions. Therefore, these duties.
both protect and limit the sovereignty and equality of all states.
One of these duties, the duty of non-intervention, is a generally
accepted principle of customary international law.87 While the U.N.
Charter does not directly restrict intervention, the duty of non-inter-
vention can be implied from the Charter's language.88 To confirm
this implied duty, and to dispel all doubts, the U.N. adopted several
declarations dealing specifically with the intervention issue. First, in
December of 1965, the U.N. adopted the Declaration on the Inad-
missibility of Intervention,89 which clearly denounced all forms of
intervention. Second, in 1970, the U.N. restated and reinforced this
principle in The Declaration of Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States.90 Fur-
ther, later resolutions of international organizations have strength-
ened the status of the non-intervention principle.91
non-aggression and abstention from armed conflict, the duty to fulfill good faith obligations
under treaties and other international agreements, and the duty not to intervene or interfere in
the affairs of other states. S.A. WILLIAMS & A.L.C. DE MESTRAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 46 (1987) [hereinafter WILLIAMS].
87. R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 281 (1974) [herein-
after VINCENT].
If a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies that other states have a
duty to respect that right by, among other things, refraining from intervention in
its domestic affairs. The principle of non-intervention identifies the rights of
states to sovereignty as a standards in international society and makes explicit
the respect required for it in abstention intervention.
The formation of the principle of non-intervention in international relations
might be said, then to be one of protecting the principle of state sovereignty.
Id. at 14. However, this was clearly not always the case. Throughout much of history, inter-
vention was an acceptable means of assisting a people who seem "to have justice on its side."
VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 131 (C. Benwick trans 1758). The change in international law
regarding intervention came about after World War I, when war itself was outlawed. Cutler,
supra note 1, at 97.
88. The duty may be inferred from U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. I, see supra note 85,
and from art. 2, para. 4 that states: "All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any matter inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The duty may
also be inferred from U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 that reads in part: "Nothing contained in
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are es-
sentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... " While art. 2, para. 7 expressly
prohibits only the United Nations from intervening, this could be extended by implication to
also include intervention by its member states. WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 47.
89. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States
and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 14 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 20) at II (adopted by a vote of 109-0-1, the U.K. abstaining); see R. SWIFT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CURRENT AND CLASSIC 165-67 (1969). This Declaration, in part, reads:
"I. No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the
internal or external affairs of any other State . I..." d
90. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 21, U.N. Doc A/8028 (1971).
91. See Oppermann, Intervention in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
234 (1982) [hereinafter Oppermann]. Notably, in 1975, the Institut de Droit International (a
60-member college of cardinels of international law scholars) also issued a resolution entitled:
The Principle of Non-Intervention in Civil Wars. This resolution further affirmed the United
Nation's view of intervention. Also, the International Court of Justice always has recognized
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B. Intervention and Civil War
1. Definition of Intervention.-Intervention may be defined as
a state's interference with the affairs of another state "without law-
ful justification for the purposes of altering or maintaining conditions
there." 92 Intervention is interference designed to "induce a certain
behavior" of another state, "whereby the intervening state employs
coercion and violates the sovereign will of its victim."
93
What, then, constitutes "interference?" According to the U.N.
Declarations of 1965 and 1970, interference of any type is prohib-
ited.9" Thus, the U.N. adopted a very broad definition of interfer-
ence. This broad definition would include not only direct forcible in-
tervention, but also indirect forcible intervention, and non-forcible
intervention, such as economic or political interference.95
2. Civil War.-The principle of non-interference is of particu-
lar importance in the context of civil war for two reasons. First, it is
a useful tool in preventing civil war from escalating into an interna-
tional war.96 Second, the principle can prevent a state from en-
couraging internal conflicts in other states for that state's own
advantage.97
Civil war can be defined as a war between two or more groups
of inhabitants of the same state.9" The most common form of civil
war99 is a conflict between the established government"' and insur-
gents. 101 The present situation in Afghanistan presents a classic ex-
the prohibition of intervention as exemplified in Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 35.
92. WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 47; see also OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 134-8
(H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1965); Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 5, at 105-06; J. BRIERLY, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 402 (6th ed. 1963).
93. Oppermann, supra note 91, at 233.
94. Prior to the Declarations (supra notes 89 and 90), it was unclear whether the inter-
vention meant only direct armed attack or whether it also included other interference. Id. at
234; WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 48.
95. WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 47.
96. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (1984)
[hereinafter AKEHURST].
97. In today's international environment, states frequently attempt to expand their terri-
tories by "encouraging factions sharing their own ideology to seize or retain power in other
states." Id.
98. AKEHURST, CIVIL WAR, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1982)
[hereinafter AKEHURST, CIVIL WAR].
99. Other forms of civil war include: part of the population attempting to secede to form
a new state, rebels merely trying to force the government to make concessions, or even war
between factions within a state while the government remains a neutral bystander. Id.; see also
R. FALK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 18-19 (1971) (five types of conflict). For
purposes of this Comment, use of the most common type, mentioned in the text, is both rele-
vant and sufficient.
100. Also referred to as "de jure" government, and for purposes of this Comment, as the
Afghan regime or government.
101. Insurgents can be defined as "individuals who wish to set up a new government or a
new State .... " AKEHURST, supra note 96, at 240. In this comment, insurgent is used inter-
changeably with rebel, resistance, mujahidin and freedom fighter; but see id. at 240.
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ample of civil war: the Afghan government is warring with a resis-
tance movement that arose out of the Afghan populace with
intentions of overthrowing the established government.
3. Intervention in the Context of Civil War.-The duty of
non-intervention exists equally in the context of civil war. A civil war
generally violates neither customary international law nor Article
2(4) of the U.N. Charter." 2 However, the fact that civil war is legal
on its face does not mean that foreign intervention in a civil war is
also permitted under international law. 3
As a general rule, outside states are prohibited from providing
"help"' 4 to insurgents in a civil war.' 05 The U.N. Declarations of
1965 and 1970 expressly prohibit any such aid that would be used to
overthrow the established government of another state. 0 Therefore,
in the civil war context, the duty of non-intervention is a valid rule,
particularly with regard to insurgent forces.107
4. Applying Intervention Rules to Pakistan's Involvement in
the Afghan Crisis.-In recent years, Pakistan openly admits being
the major arms conduit between the U.S. and the mujahidin.'08
Pakistani officials control not only the means of supplying arms and
money to the rebels, but also the quality and quantity of arms re-
ceived by the mujahidin.0° Further, Pakistan, upon its own invita-
tion, has been the home base for rebel leaders since the Soviet inva-
Also note that no distinction is made between the classification of rebel, insurgent and
belligerent for purposes of this comment. This classification is not relevant to an issue in this
paper. See id. at 242 n.1; BOWETT, THE INTERRELATION OF THEORIES OF INTERVENTION AND
SELF-DEFENSE in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 41 n.9 (1974) [hereinafter
BOWETT]; Firmage, supra note I at 406-07. For a discussion of the recognition of insurgency
and belligerency see Riedel, Recognition of Belligerency, Recognition of Insurgency in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 165-71 (1982); STARKE, supra note 83, at 146-48;
VINCENT, supra note 87, at 286-87.
102. AKEHURST, CIVIL WAR, supra note 98, at 88. Certain civil wars may, of course,
violate some rule of international law, such as a government's use of force to prevent the
exercise of the legal right of self-determination. Id.
103. Id. at 89; HARRIS, supra note 32, at 649.
104. Help is defined as any assistance that would be violative of the international neu-
trality rules for international wars. See AKEHURST, supra note 96, at 241-42. Some aid to
insurgents is allowable. For example, foreign nationals may provide food to parties involved in
a civil war. Id. at 241. This allowable aid is not at issue, and therefore excluded from the
definition of help for purposes of this comment.
105. AKEHURST, CIVIL WAR, supra note 98, at 89; AKEHURST, supra note 96, at 242;
HARRIS, supra note 32, at 649.
106. Paragraph 2 of the 1965 Declaration (supra note 89), in part, reads: "2 .... no
state shall organize, assist, foment finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state or interfere in
the civil strife of another State." A major principle behind the Declarations of 1965 and 1970
is "that internal conflicts within a state are the concern of that state alone." BOWETr, supra
note 101, at 41; see also HARRIS, supra note 32, at 649.
107. AKEHURST, CIVIL WAR, supra note 98, at 89.
108. ALl, supra note 15, at 176.
109. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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sion in 1979.110 From this home base, resistance leaders plan
strategy and receive instruction and training from Pakistani and
American intelligence agents."'
Clearly, these Pakistani actions fit within the broad definition of
intervention adopted by the United Nations. The Declarations of
1965 and 1970 state that it is contrary to international law to: "or-
ganize, assist, . . . incite or tolerate subversive or armed activities"
aimed at overturning an established government of another state."
2
Pakistan not only tolerated the actions of the rebels on Pakistan soil,
but also actively encouraged and assisted the resistance in organizing
and fighting the Soviet-backed Afghan government."'
The International Court of Justice has always assumed that
general customary international law prohibits intervention." 4 How-
ever, until Nicaragua v. U.S., the Court had had no opportunity to
rule on the legality of any intervention in recent history. 1 5 In the
Nicaragua v. U.S. case, the U.S. had been supplying weapons, train-
ing and other aid to contra forces against the established government
in Nicaragua." 6 The Court held' 17 that the U.S. actions constituted
intervention, and as such, were violations of international law.118
The present situation in Afghanistan is analogous to the Nicara-
gua conflict. In both situations, a third state provided aid to insur-
gents involved in a civil war. Therefore, in both situations, the third
state intervened into the internal affairs of another state. Unless such
110. See supra note 72-74 and accompanying text.
111. See ALl , supra note 15, at 176; Rashid, supra note 66, at 241; see supra notes 78-
79 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
114. Oppermann, supra note 91, at 234. The International Court or Justice, in Nicara-
gua v. U.S., stated: "The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign
State to conduct its affairs without outside interference; . . . the Court considers that it is part
on parcel of customary international law." Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 5, at 106.
115. Id. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 1, at 106.
116. Id. at 20-22.
117. By a vote of twelve votes to three. Voting in the majority were: President Nagendra
Singh (India); Vice-President Guy Ladreit de Lachariere (France); Judges Manfred Lachs
(Poland), Jose Maria Ruda (Argentina), Taslim Olawale Elias (Nigeria), Roberto Ago (It-
aly), Jose Sette-Camara (Brazil), Keba Mbaye (Senegal), Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algeria), Ni
Zhengyu (China), Jens Eversen (Norway); and Judge ad hoc Claude-Albert Colliard. Voting
against the majority on this provision were: Judges Shigeru Oda (Japan), Stephen Schwebel
(United States) and Sir Robert Y. Jennings (United Kingdom). Id. at 146.
118. The provision stated:
THE COURT
(3) By twelve votes to three.
Decides that the United States of America, training, arming, equipping, fi-
nancing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting
and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has
acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under cus-
tomary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another State;
Id. at 146.
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intervention is justified, it is a violation of international law. 1 ' Hav-
ing determined that Pakistan intervened, the more controversial
question remains: was that intervention justified or excused in any
way?1
20
C. Exceptions to the Duty of Non-Intervention and Justifications
for Intervention
Repeated violations of the U.N.'s broad definition of interven-
tion tends to show its impracticality in the world today. 12 Further, a
legal basis for exceptions to the general rule does exist: just as sover-
eignty is not absolute, neither is the duty of non-intervention. 22
The U.N. Charter recognizes only one exception to the restric-
tion on the use of force:' 2 3 the right of self-defense as found in Arti-
cle 51 .124 Despite this however, states have attempted to justify in-
tervention on other grounds alleged to exist in customary
international law.'26 Justifications used or proposed for use in recent
history are:
2 6
1. Intervention allowed in Article 51 (self-defense);1
2 7
2. Collective intervention by enforcement action authorized
by the Security Council of the U.N.; 28
119. The Court in Nicaragua v. U.S. stated: "Having concluded that the activities of the
United States . . . constitute prima facie acts of intervention, the Court must next consider
whether they may nevertheless be justified on some legal ground." Id. at 126.
120. Id.
121. See supra note I and accompanying text,
122. T. NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 287 (1983).
[T]he rights of political sovereignty and territorial integrity are not absolute, and therefore the
ban on intervention is not absolute either." Id.
123. The restriction on the use of force is found in U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, supra
note 88,
124. Cutler states that:
The only exception to this prohibition is Article 51 of the charter, which
exempts any action taken in individual or collective self defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . .Even this excep-
tion is permitted only until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
Cutler, supra note 87, at 48.
125. Oppermann, supra note 91, at 233.
126. For a list of justifications see WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 48-51.
127. See supra note 124. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Secur-
ity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
The individual right of self-defense is discussed below. See supra notes 136-54 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of collective self-defense see DELBRUCK, COLLECTIVE SELF-DE-
FENSE, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 114-17 (1982); AKEHURST, supra
note 96, at 244-45; HARRIS, supra note 32, at 653-55 (Vietnam example).
128. Authority is granted pursuant to U.N. CHARTER chap. VII. Enforcement action
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3. Intervention as required by treaty;" 9
4. Intervention to protect nationals;130
5. Intervention at invitation of government;318
6. Intervention to protect right of self-determination; " 2
7. Humanitarian intervention;13 3 and
8. Counterintervention.13"
The applicability or validity of all of the above-listed justifications is
unclear and open to debate.1 3 5 The justifications that can best be
applied to Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan are: self-defense in-
tervention, humanitarian intervention and counterintervention.
1. Self-Defense Intervention.
(a) Protective Self-Defense.-Article 51 of the U.N. Charter al-
lows for the use of force by a victim of an attack as a means of self-
defense to repel the attack.13 6 According to a literal interpretation of
Article 51, the justification cannot be invoked until armed attack ac-
tually occurs.13 7 Further, any justified force used must be immedi-
could also be authorized by General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. G.A.
Res. 388 A(v), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951). See Wil-
liams, supra note 86, at 48.
129. See HARRIS, supra note 32, at 655 (Cyprus crisis as example of intervention re-
quired by treaty).
130. See STARKE, supra note 83, at 146; also see HARRIS, supra note 32, at 653 (Do-
minican Republic crisis as example of intervention to protect nationals). This justification is
often considered a variation of humanitarian intervention. See BEYERLIN, HUMANITARIAN IN-
TERVENTION, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 211-14 (1982) [hereinafter
BEYERLIN].
131. See BOWETT, supra note 101, at 42-43; Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 5, at 126. "In
the case of internal strife, an invitation by the government cannot justify intervention, as when
the outcome of the domestic war is doubtful, the government cannot hold itself out to speak for
the state." WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 50.
132. Self-determination intervention involves aid to rebels in colonial territories who are
fighting a war of national liberation. AKEHURST, CIVIL WAR, supra note 98, at 89. There is
general disagreement over the legality of such intervention. Developing and Communist states
argue that it is legal, while Western states claim it is illegal. HARRIS, supra note 32, at 649.
The U.N. has generally respected the right to self-determination, but has not spoke to self-
determination intervention. See Bowett, supra note 101, at 43 n.13; see also H. ESPIELL, THE
RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION (1980) (U.N. Resolutions supporting self-determination).
133. See infra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
135. ". . . [M]ost grounds of justification are of doubtful value, especially as regards
notions of self-help, humanitarian intervention or according to the 'rules' of Soviet interna-
tional law ...." Oppermann, supra note 91, at 63.
136. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51, supra note 127.
137. The Court stated that:
There appears now to be general agreement on the acts which can be
treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be
agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action
by regular armed forces across an international border, but also "the sending by
or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which
carry out acts of armed force against another State or such gravity as to amount
to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, "or its sub-
stantial involvement therein." This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph
(g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution
3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law.
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ately reported to the Security Council.'3 8 This classic form of self-
defense, also called protective self-defense,"3 9 is inherent in custom-
ary international law, 14 0 as is evidenced by the language of Article
51.141
In the present situation, there is no evidence that, prior to its
intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan was attacked in any manner
that would require self-defense. Armed attacks in the form of air
strikes by the Soviets and Afghans occurred, but only after, and in
response to, intervention by Pakistan. 42 Therefore, Pakistan was not
justified in intervening in Afghanistan for the purpose of protective
self-defense.
(b) Anticipatory or Preventive Self-Defense.-Another form of
the self-defense justification that existed in customary law is antici-
patory or preventive self-defense. 43 This justification rule was origi-
nally laid out in The Carolina case.144 The Carolina was a steamer
used by the rebels in the Canadian Rebellion of 1837 to transport
men and supplies from United States to Canada. The American gov-
ernment was unable14 1 to stop this transport, so the Great Britain-
backed government sent Canadian militia into America. The militia
finally destroyed the Carolina, but killed several American citizens
in the process.' 6 The ensuing controversy revolved around whether
Great Britain's actions were justified under self-defense. The Court
held 14 7 that any force used in self-defense must be first, immediately
necessary, and second, limited to the amount necessary to repel the
aggressor's attack.148
Although the doctrine clearly existed in customary law, there is
general disagreement as to whether the doctrine survived the adop-
tion of the U.N. Charter. 4 9 On its face, the language of Article 51
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 5, at 103.
138. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
139. See VINCENT, supra note 87 at 402.
140. BRIERLY, supra note 92, at 402.
141. The language of article 51 merely codifies the self defense rule already existing in
customary law.
The Court therefore finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful
on the basis that there is a "natural" or "inherent" right of self-defence, and it is
hard to see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present
content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 5, at 109.
142. Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 23; see also supra note 59.
143. HARRIS, supra note 32, at 658; also see VINCENT, supra note 87, at 288-90.
144. Caroline, 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409 (1906).
145. Or unwilling to stop the rebels. See BRIERLY, supra note 92, at 405.
146. Id. at 405-06; HARRIS, supra note 32, at 655-57.
147. The Court adopted the rule of law as stated by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel
Webster. BRIERLY, supra note 92, at 406.
148. Id.
149. HARRIS, supra note 32, at 658.
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allows the use of force only after armed attack150 and therefore, re-
cent use of the doctrine has been criticized.
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan presented Pakistan with
many problems. Pakistan faced the dangers of being a front-line
state bordering on a hostile world power, the Soviet Union. The So-
viet Union had over 115,000 troops located throughout Afghanistan,
including troops placed on the Pakistani-Afghan border.15 1 Many
diplomats, including Pakistani officials thoughts that the next move
for the Soviet Troops would be into Pakistan. 153 Therefore, Pakistan
reacted by aiding anti-regime rebels.1
54
While the dangers faced by Pakistan were not illusory, it is
questionable whether these dangers were of such an immediate na-
ture as to require intervention by Pakistan. Due to the doubtful exis-
tence of the doctrine in international law today, and because of the
dubious necessity of Pakistan's actions, the doctrine of anticipatory
self-defense provides a weak legal justification for Pakistani
intervention.
2. Humanitarian Intervention.-Another justification for Pa-
kistan's invasion might be found in the doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention. Humanitarian intervention can be defined as interference
by one state to protect the human rights of citizens of another
state.155 Although often invoked as a justification for intervention, 56
the doctrine exists in direct conflict with Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. 157 Therefore, as a general principle, humanitarian interven-
tion is "neither legally or politically acceptable.'
58
The major difficulty with the humanitarian intervention doctrine
is that the decision to intervene would be at the discretion of an indi-
vidual state,159 and would create too many opportunities for abuse.6 0
Thus, the general rule prohibits such intervention. Some legal schol-
ars, however, state that there may be extreme cases where the doc-
trine could be applied, 61 as for the protection of a large mass of
refugees. 6 '
150. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
151. HARRIS, supra note 32, at 658-59.
152. See AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, supra note 6, at 2-7, 9.
153. See supra note 54.
154. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
155. BEYERLIN, supra note 130, at 212.
156. Id. at 213.
157. Id.; see also supra note 135.
158. BOWETT, supra note 101, at 45; BEYERLIN, supra note 130, at 212; but see Lillich,
Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv. 325 (1967).
159. BEYERLIN, supra note 130, at 212.
160. Id.
161. NARDIN, supra note 122, at 239 (intervention to stop "great crimes" and to pre-
serve international minimal standards).
162. For a situation very similar to the Afghan-Pakistani crisis which involved Pakistan,
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The Afghan refugees living in Pakistan are costing Pakistan
money, jobs and land."' Also, the refugee camps are crowded and
unsafe.'"" Nevertheless, the refugees will remain in Pakistan until
the fighting in Afghanistan slows down.0 5 The fighting may not stop
until the Communist regime government is removed from power, due
to the strong convictions of fundamentalist mujahidin.'"° Therefore,
it may be in Pakistan's best interests and in the best interests of the
refugees to support the rebel forces.
Pakistan's intervention in Afghanistan may be a socially respon-
sible, and even wise, individual policy decision. However, the inter-
national society believes that the interest of preventing widespread
abuse of the doctrine overrides the equities involved in a particular
intervention.' 6 7 Thus, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
would be a weak legal justification for Pakistan's intervention.
3. Counterintervention.-In order for the rule of non-interven-
tion to work, such a rule must be uniformly observed. 168 In a civil
war, if the rule is violated on one side, it is generally agreed that
limited intervention by the other side should be permitted. 6"9 There-
fore, if a government is receiving foreign help, the insurgents proba-
bly also are permitted to receive a proportionate amount of foreign
help.1
70
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Egypt provided the
Afghan rebels with weapons and military training, while Saudi Ara-
bia contributed currency.' 7 The interventions on the side of the Af-
ghan rebels by Egypt and Saudi Arabia were justified because the
Soviet Union had first intervened on behalf of the established gov-
ernment. 7 12 This reasoning also justifies both the weapons and money
supplied by the U.S., and the help given by Pakistan, to the Afghan
rebels. Pakistan's intervention in Afghanistan would therefore be le-
gally justifiable as counterintervention.
India and Bangladesh, see HARRIS, supra note 32, at 605; BEYERLIN, supra note 130, at 212.
163. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
164. See generally AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, supra note 6,
at 19.
165. See Lief, When (iJy the Soviets Go, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 12, 1988
at 25 [hereinafter Lief]; Yalowitz, Worldgram, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 7, 1988,
at 46 [hereinafter Yalowitz].
166. "The Afghan mujahidin say they will fight to the last man . Whitehead,
supra note 29, at 2; Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 22.
167. BEYERLIN, supra note 130, at 213.
168. Firmage, supra note 101, at 408.
169. Id. at 409; AKEHURST, supra note 96, at 242; AKEHURST, CIVIL WAR, supra note
98, at 89; WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 50-51; Cutler, supra note 87, at 101.
170. Id.




IV. Movement Towards a Soviet Withdrawal
A. Initial Negotiations
Initially, Pakistan rallied support in opposition to the Soviet oc-
cupation, but refused to involve itself in negotiations for a Soviet
withdrawal. 7" Finally, late in 1981, Pakistan requested that the
United Nations become involved in the crisis, by appointing a repre-
sentative to explore this situation.7 4 The U.N. appointed such a rep-
resentative, 7 5 and after initial discussions, formal meetings were
held in Geneva throughout 1982 and 1983. 17' These meetings, while
helpful in determining the major issues, 77 showed little progress to-
wards a final withdrawal settlement. Talks continued periodically
throughout 1984 and 1985, and again produced no results.'78
During the period from 1980-86, the U.N. General Assembly
passed eight resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan. 17 Though the Soviets refused to abide by the res-
olutions, the U.N. could not take any action due to the Soviet
Union's Security Council veto power.' 80 Due to Moscow's apparent
intent to remain in Afghanistan, withdrawal seemed unlikely.
B. Success of the Resistance Movement
Besides using physical force, the Soviets attempted to "Soviet-
ize" the Afghan spirit, 18' that is, Moscow tried to bring Soviet ideas
and ideals into Afghanistan. Due to the Afghans strong rejection of
these ideals, the mujahidin became more unified and more adept at
fighting the Soviets.'82 By the early 1980s Moscow had gained no
ground on the rebels. 183 After four years of Soviet occupation, the
173. Wriggins, supra note 53, at 301.
174. Id. The Soviets agreed with the request, probably as a result of "near-universal
support." Id.
175. Perez de Cuellar was appointed as representative and was replaced by Diego
Cordovez soon after preliminary talks were started. Id.
176. These meetings involved Cordovez visiting government officials in: Kabul, Afghani-
stan; Islamabad, Pakistan; Tehran, Iran; and Moscow, Russia. Id. Pakistan and Afghanistan
were the actual parties involved in the negotiations, but the U.S. and the Soviet Union were to
act as guarantors of any agreement reached and their views were clearly expressed. Watson,
Will Moscow Pull Out?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 18, 1988, at 32, 33 [hereinafter
Watson].
177. "Four principles were eventually agreed upon among the parties: (1) a withdrawal
of Soviet troops; (2) an end to 'outside interference' in Afghanistan's affairs; (3) a safe return
of the refugees; and (4) international supervision and guarantees of the final settlement."
Wriggins, supra note 53, at 301.
178. Karp, supra note 74, at 18.
179. The Resolutions were passed on the following dates: January 14, 1980; November
20, 1980; November 18, 1981; November 29, 1982; November 23, 1983; November 15, 1984;
November 13, 1985; and November 5, 1986.
180. See Cutler, supra note 1, at 99.
181. Whitehead, supra note 29, at 2.
182. See Karp, supra note 74.
183. A commentator writes that:
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mujahidin controlled about eighty-two percent of the countryside,
and Moscow was spending between $15 and $20 million per day to
keep the rebels out of the other eighteen percent of the country. 84
The Soviets reacted by replacing Karmal with Najibullah, the
former chief of the Afghan secret police (KHAD), in May 1986.85
The Soviets had also attempted to appease the Afghan citizens by
formally showing respect for the Islamic faith . 8  Najibullah called
for a cease-fire and a national reconciliation, both of which were
largely ignored by both sides.' 87  Najibullah also proposed a new
Constitution, but the resistance movement was further incited when
he had himself installed as President under the new Constitution.1
8 8
In 1987, the resistance grew even stronger, and the Soviets were
forced to take defensive positions in key Afghan cities. 89 Soviet
army casualties continued to increase' 90 while respect for the Red
Army continued to decline. 191 Soviet involvement in the Afghan war
prompted comparisons to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam'92 as the
The world's attention span has been reckoned at 90 days, which unhappily,
is probably right. Afghanistan has all but slipped from sight . . . But still the
war goes on. The Russians, incredibly, are no nearer victory than at the start,
when experts blandly forecast that their modern army would subdue primitive
tribesmen in months. It is bigger news than a bored world realizes. New York
Times editorial, June 1, 1982.
GIRADET, supra note 9, at 12.
184. HUSAIN, ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR AFGHANISTAN, in AFGHAN ALTERNATIVES
189, 190 (1983).
185. "Najibullah's rise can largely be attributed to a Soviet desire to see party, govern-
ment and military policies more effectively implemented." BACKGROUND NOTES SERIES, AF-
GHANISTAN, supra note 6, at 5; see also ALl, supra note 15, at 178.
186. One commentator writes that:
Recently the government announced with great fanfare the establishment of
an Islamic research center, although Westerners claim that it has only 200
books so far. An evening television news program featured a Koran-reading con-
test coinciding with the sacred month of Ramadan. Afghan soldiers could be
seen patrolling the streets with a rifle in one hand and Muslim prayer beads
dangling from the other. Often at meetings with the press, officials made an
elaborate point of apologizing for their weakness or dizziness, saying that [they]
were fasting all day in keeping with the holiday.
Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 22.
187. AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCUPATION, supra note 6, at 12.
188. Id. at 15.
189. Id. at 2-7. The resistance was stronger, due in part, to U.S. aid of $715 million in
1987. The "biggest bequest to any Third World insurgency." Girardet, The Alchemy of Turn-
ing Guns into Luxury Villas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 30, 1987, at 36 [hereinaf-
ter Girardet].
One of the greatest advances for rebel forces was use of "stinger" weapons. These weap-
ons, supplied by the U.S. through Pakistan, all but stopped Afghan air strikes via helicopter
and could have turned the tide for the rebels. See Rashid, supra note 66, at 241-42.
190. The most conservative estimate by the U.S. State Department is that Soviets have
suffered 35,000 casualties, one-third of which were fatalities. This number does not include the
large numbers of soldiers stricken by illnesses such as malaria, jaundice, typhus, dysentary,
hepatitus and heatstroke, or stung by scorpions. Keller, Home From Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES,
MAG., Feb. 14, 1988 at 24-28 [hereinafter Keller]. It is estimated that the Afghan crisis has
cost the Soviet Union "at least 18,000 Soviet lives." Watson, supra note 176, at 32.
191. Keller, supra note 190, at 92.
192. Id. at 26-28 (prolonged foreign war of questionable purpose).
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war became unpopular among the Soviet populace.' Afghan and
Soviet officials also began to talk of mistakes made in the invasion.
Finally, in 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader, made it
clear that the Soviets wanted to withdraw. 94
C. Withdrawal Negotiations in 1986-1987
In 1986, Moscow had implied that it was considering with-
drawal, however, at negotiations, little progress was made.' 95 Never-
theless, the gap between the parties regarding the withdrawal time-
table was decreased to less than one year.' The Soviet Union
demanded that an interim or transitional government be set up with
the Najibullah as leader, and that the U.S. halt all aid to the rebels
before it would withdraw troops. Clearly, these demands were not
acceptable to the U.S., Pakistan or the Afghan rebels. 97
In 1987, Moscow finally began making concessions at the bar-
gaining table. 98 The Soviets further decreased the withdrawal time
table to ten months and acceded to U.S. demands for a front-loading
plan.'99 Also, the Soviets, having become displeased with Najibullah,
offered to withdraw if any broad-based transitional government was
set up."° Finally, the Soviets went one step further: they agreed to
withdraw even without the establishment of an interim
government.201
193. Id. at 91 (public opinion polls).
194. Moscow was said to be "increasingly desperate "for withdrawal, and Gorbachev
called the Afghan occupation a "bleeding wound." Kifner, Moscow Is Seen at Turning Point
In Its Intervention in Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter
Kifner]; see also Weisman, Neighbors of Afghanistan, supra note 12, § 5, at 3, col. 1; Keller,
supra note 190, at 27.
195. Watson, supra note 176, at 33.
196. Initially, the two sides were far apart. The Soviets offered a withdrawal timetable
of 48 months, while Pakistan demanded a 3-month withdrawal. However, by early 1987, this
gap had shortened to 32 months, and then to less than one year. Gap on Time-frame for
Withdrawal of Troops Narrowed to Less Than a Year, U.N. CHRONICLE, May, 1987, at 59.
197. See Lief, supra note 165, at 25-26. The Soviets stated that when they pull out of
Afghanistan, the country would be thrown into a violent chaos. Keller, supra note 190, at 91.
Western diplomats say that a blood bath will be averted because much of the Afghan army
will desert. The U.N. is considering the use of a peace-keeping force. Watson, supra note 176,
at 51.
198. Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 23. While the Soviets are conceding
at the negotiations table, the Soviet troops "don't seem to be packing their bags." Rather, they
are building barricades and buildings. Id.; see also Taylor, Gorbachev's Problem: How To
Lose a War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 11, 1988, at 40.
199. Yalowitz, Worldgram, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Feb. 22, 1988, at 64. The
"front loading" request involves removal of at least one-half of Soviet combat troops in the
first 2-3 months. This is a device to test Soviet sincerity and to protect the rebels after cutoff of
U.S. aid. Watson, supra note 176, at 33.
200. Watson, supra note 176, at 32. "General Najibullah ...is coming to be regarded
as the most difficult kind of ally: one who is politically and militarily weak, but determined to
act strong and independent." Kifner, supra note 194, at 9; see also Yalowitz, supra note 165,
at 46 (proposals for type of transitional government).
201. "Mr. Gorbachev must have finally decided that no future Afghan government can
afford to be hostile to Moscow, and that any such government would be preferable to the
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This final concession pleased everyone except Pakistan." 2 Paki-
stan feared that the refugees would refuse to return to Afghanistan
if its government was in disarray.20 3 Therefore, Pakistan demanded
that a broad-based interim government be set up.2"4 Since this time,
however, Pakistan has backed off this stance for two reasons: first,
the unlikelihood of reaching an agreement on this issue;205 second,
the likelihood that any agreement reached would be ignored.20 6
The Soviets agreed to withdraw troops beginning on May 15,
1988, if an accord was reached by March 15, 1988.207 Due to a dis-
pute over the cut-off of U.S. aid to the rebels, an agreement was not
reached by Mnrch 15.208 Recently, however, Gorbachev publicly
promised the Soviet people that withdrawal would begin by mid-
May. 20
9
D. Applying the Rule of Non-Intervention and its Exception to the
Withdrawal Situation
While the withdrawal situation is still uncertain, it is necessary
to look into the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal and analyze poten-
tial Pakistan actions in light of this. Assuming a Soviet with-
drawal,21 0 Pakistan has two alternatives: continue to help the resis-
tance or halt all aid to the rebels. If the U.S. continues to supply
arms, and other aid to the rebels after withdrawal, then Pakistan
would probably continue in its capacity as conduit.211 Even if the
U.S. halts all support to the rebels, 12 it is likely that Peshawar
would still be open to the rebels as a home base for strategic opera-
tions. Pakistan could thus continue to assist the rebels in other
ways.
213
1. Practical Considerations.-Despite U.S. or Soviet actions,
staggering losses sustained in propping up Mr. Najibullah." Weisman, Neighbors, supra note
12, at 3.
202. Id.; Lief, supra note 165, at 25.
203. Weisman, Neighbors, supra note 12, at 3; Lief, supra note 165, at 25.
204. Lief, supra note 165, at 25.
205. Id. at 26.
206. Yalowitz, supra note 165, at 46. An agreement now is not a guarantee of harmony
later. Tribal rivalries run deep. When exiles return to Afghanistan, the struggle for power will
increase among the rebel groups. "Signatures on agreements will seem less binding when self-
interest appears endangered." Id.
207. Worldgram, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 28, 1988, at 35.
208. Id.
209. Gordon, Gorbachev and Afghan Leader Say Way Seems Clear to Start Soviet
Troop Pullout by May 15, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 3; see also Gordon,
Soviets Believed To Be Preparing Afghan Pullout, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
210. This is becoming more of a probability everyday. Id.
211. Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 23.
212. This is not likely to happen unless all Soviet aid to the Afghan regime is halted.
See supra note 208.
213. ALI, supra note 15, at 176; Rashid, supra note 65, at 241.
[Vol. 6:3
MUJAHIDIN MIDDLEMAN
Pakistan is currently faced with its own dilemma as to whether or
not to continue aiding the rebels. Pakistan must consider the practi-
cal effects of its decision. First, Pakistan has always supported the
rebels in the past, and a sudden-cut-off of any help could cause bad
feelings between the mujahidin and Pakistan. Pakistan could even
become an enemy of fundamentalist groups of Afghan refugees, if
Zia "sells them out."1
2 1 '
Second, and most important, Pakistan has to consider the return
of the refugees to Afghanistan." 5 As long as chaos continues in Af-
ghanistan, the Afghan refugees will remain in Pakistan.1 There-
fore, it might be in the best interests of Pakistan to help the
mujahidin seize power quickly and establish a government accept-
able to the refugees.
Last, Pakistan must consider the possible Soviet reactions and
balance these against the other factors. If the rebels gain power in
Afghanistan, it is possible that the Soviets may return, possibly in
greater numbers, with more hostility towards Pakistan.21 7
2. Legal Analysis.-Under the U.N.'s broad definition, any
type of interference in the internal affairs of another state constitutes
intervention. 18 Presently, Pakistan is training and advising rebel
troops, tolerating, and even encouraging, the use of Peshawar as a
home base for the resistance, and acting as the major conduit for
arms and money passed from the U.S. to the mujahidin.2 1 9 As long
as Pakistan continues any of these activities, it is violating the non-
intervention rule. This analysis would not change with the Soviet
withdrawal of troops. A Soviet withdrawal, however, may alter the
justification analysis.2 Again, unless Pakistani actions are legiti-
mately justified, they violate international law.2 1
(a) Self Defense Intervention.-After Soviet withdrawal, the
danger of a Soviet invasion is no longer immediate, if it ever was, as
Soviet troops would be at a relatively safe distance. Although the
threat of a Soviet return may be real, it would not be an immediate
danger to Pakistan's security. Thus, not only would the classical self-
214. See Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12 at 23; Ispahani, supra note 46, at
24.
215. BEYERLIN, supra note 130, at 212; AFGHANISTAN: EIGHT YEARS OF SOVIET OCCU-
PATION, supra note 6, at 19.
216. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
217. Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 23.
218. Oppermann, supra note 91, at 234; WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 47-48.
219. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
220. See supra section entitled Withdrawal Negotiation in 1986-1987 and accompany-
ing notes.
221. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 191.
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defense argument fail, as again there was no prior armed attack,222
but also the anticipatory self-defense justification would fine little
support.
(b) Humanitarian Intervention.-The withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan will bring the refugees one step closer to
returning home. This, of course, means that Pakistan is one step
closer to solving many of its prominent internal problems which have
been caused by the refugees. However, even further delays in the
exist of the Afghan refugees would not justify Pakistani intervention,
even if such intervention was solely for the benefit of the refugees.22
Although "humanism" may be a good policy, it is not a basis for
intervention in international law.22
(c) Counterintervention.-Pakistan's counterintervention justifi-
cation depends entirely on Soviet actions, as only a reaction propor-
tionate to a Soviet intervention would be justified.22 5 Thus, if Mos-
cow withdraws its troops but continues to aid the Afghan regime in
other ways, then Pakistan may be justified in giving equal aid to the
rebels. 6 If, however, Moscow halts all aid to the Afghan rebels,
then Pakistan would violate international law by aiding the rebels in
any way.227 In fact, continued Pakistani aid for the mujahidin, may
justify counterintervention by Moscow. 28
V. Conclusion
Once it has been determined that Pakistan has intervened in the
internal affairs of Afghanistan, Pakistan must produce a legitimate
justification for the interference. Most "justifications" offered by
states are controversial. They often are merely reasons why a state
acted as it did, and have no basis in international law. The justifica-
tions that are legitimate often are inapplicable to a given fact situa-
tion.22 9 However, Pakistan has a legitimate, legal and applicable jus-
tification in counterintervention. Therefore, Pakistan's past and
present interventions are justified and fall within the limits set by
international law.
The situation changes considerably if the Soviets withdraw their
troops. If this should happen, Pakistan could continue to aid the
rebels but only to the extent that Moscow aids the regime. Anything
222. See Weisman, The Great Game, supra note 12, at 23.
223. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
224. BEYERLIN, supra note 130, at 213.




229. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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beyond this equal reaction would violate international law.230
Pakistan, up to this point, has handled a delicate situation in a
manner that served its best interests, and also was within the limits
prescribed by international law. A Soviet withdrawal, however, may
be the breaking point for Pakistan, as Pakistani interests may run
contrary to international law.
Peter A. Pentz
230. WILLIAMS, supra note 86, at 50-51; AKEHURST, supra note 96, at 242.
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